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Injunctions in European Patent Law
The proportionality of  patent law injunctions has been under discussion for some time now 
in Germany, originally with a focus on  patent enforcement by non- practicing entities.1 The 
discussion has been revived recently, concentrating on standard- essential patents (SEPs) 
and complex products.2 The latter is exemplified by cases where the  patent concerned pro-
tects a technology, which is only a minor component of a complex system. Scenarios fre-
quently invoked relate to patented chip technology, installed in the control unit of larger 
machinery, such as connected cars, or in general if the distribution of a complex system has 
to be stopped because of the  patent infringement by a minor part.3 The potential effect of 
the injunction to stop the use of the system as a whole is seen as excessive by some.4 The 
main argument is that a cease and desist order is only founded with regard to the minor 
component, but will in practical terms prevent the distribution of the end product. The in-
tensity of the discussion is such that the legislator is currently reviewing the legal situation.5
The aim of the present article is to explore the environment for an injunction from a statu-
tory perspective de lege lata. To this end it first takes a look at the international instruments, 
which serve as common foundations – or at least points of reference – for the application 
of national  patent laws in the EU, namely the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights of 1995 (TRIPS)6 and – at the European level – the Enforcement Direc-
tive7 (Part I). On this basis, second, a closer look then is taken on the practice of granting in-
junctions in selected European jurisdictions with a focus on Germany. The picture, however, 
would be incomplete without a look at the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA), 
which may serve as an example of unification in the field of  patent law. Despite not being 
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1 Ohly, GRUR Int. 2008, 787; Osterrieth, GRUR 2009, 540; Country report for Germany, AIPPI 
Q 219: Haft/Nack/Lunze/Heusch/Schohe/Joachim, GRUR Int. 2011, 927.
2 See only conference “Enforcing Patents Smoothly: From Automatic Injunctions to Proportion­
ate Remedies”, University of Erlangen, 22. March 2019 with a conference report to be found 
at http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/04/conference­ report­ should­ we­ say­ no­ to.html (last ac­
cessed 18. Juli 2019).
3 BGH GRUR 2016, 1031 – Wärmetauscher, para. 41; Osterrieth, GRUR 2018, 985.
4 See only views expressed in this volume by 352; Hofmann as well as references in Lüthi, GRUR 
Int. 2019, 352; Hofmann, NJW 2018, 1290.
5 Interested circles were invited to the German Federal Ministry of Justice on 20 May 2019 to dis­
cuss the matter of “Injunctions in the context of SEPs and complex products”.
6 BGBl. 1994 II 1730.
7 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.
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up and working yet it still is the result of a decades- long undertaking to identify a common 
denominator of national European  patent laws (Part II).
On this basis it eventually is argued why the  patent system as it stands already provides 
for fair and functional system of remedies taking heed of all interests concerned (Part III). 
Including a general proportionality requirement in the assessment of granting an injunc-
tion would put this system out of balance. In any event, should the legislator decide to join 
the current criticism that a general proportionality assessment is necessary, it must create 
a genuine statutory basis.
From a technical perspective there are two ways to construe such a proportionality as-
sessment: either as a cap on the procedural remedy of the injunction – presupposing that 
the preconditions for a substantive cease and desist claim are given; or as a precondition 
for the substantive right as such. As will be displayed in the following, both approaches are 
advocated for in the discussion on proportionality8 but they must be clearly delineated.
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I. Legal foundations in international law
A frequent argument in the German debate on the proportionality requirement 
is that it is mandated by international law. To test the validity of this argument it 
is necessary to study the relevant instruments in some detail, namely TRIPS and 
the Enforcement Directive. First and foremost, they exemplify that the aim to 
8 See account of Hofmann in Lüthi, GRUR Int. 2019, 352.
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establish a certain convergence in the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
is internationally recognized.9
Thus, if those instruments should explicitly provide for a proportionality as­
sessment as a requirement for granting an injunction, this must be respected by 
the national legal orders in their implementation of these instruments.
1. The TRIPS- Agreement of 1995
a) Applicability
The primary objective of TRIPS is to strengthen and harmonize the protection of 
intellectual property on a worldwide scale.10 Originally, both the Community and 
its Member States acceded to TRIPS by virtue of shared competence.11 Hence, in 
the application of TRIPS, it was necessary to determine the dividing line between 
the obligations under TRIPS assumed by the European Union and those remain­
ing in the responsibility of the Member States.
However, the relevant point in time to assess the distribution of competences 
is the entry into force of the current TFEU.12 In its Art. 207, it sets new standards 
particularly by attributing “commercial aspects of intellectual property” to the 
exclusive competence of the European Union in matters of the common com­
mercial policy according to Art. 3(1)(e) TFEU.13 In Daiichi Sankyo et al. /DEMO, 
the CJEU concluded that TRIPS falls within the field of common commercial 
policy in its entirety and is hence excluded from the field of the internal market.14 
However, the Court also reiterates that this attribution in particularly reflects the 
fact that the context of those rules is the liberalization of international trade and 
not the harmonization of the law of the Member States. Therefore, the European 
Union remains free to legislate on the subject of intellectual property rights by 
 9 TRIPS, Preamble; CJEU, Opinion 1/94 of the Court of 15 November 1994, European Court re­
ports 1994 Page I­05267 = NJW 1995, 2543, para. 58; CJEU, Schieving- Nijstad vof and Others v 
Robert Groeneveld, C­ 89/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:438 = GRUR Int. 2002, 41, para. 36; Enforcement 
Directive Recitals 3–5; Benkard/Ullmann/Tochtermann, PatG, 11th ed. 2015, Internationaler Teil, 
paras. 77 et seq.
10 CJEU, Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994, European Court reports 1994 Page I­ 05267 = NJW 
1995, 2543, para 58; CJEU, Schieving- Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld, C­ 89/99, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:438 = GRUR Int. 2002, 41, para. 36.
11 CJEU, Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos Ldª v Merck & Co. Inc. and Merck Sharp & 
Dohme Ldª, C­ 431/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:496 = GRUR 2008, 55, paras. 31 et seq.
12 In Daiichi Sankyo et al. /DEMO, the CJEU is clear in saying that neither its Opinion 1/94 nor the 
judgment in Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos are applicable any more because they 
relate to the old Art. 133 EC, which does not mention commercial aspects of intellectual prop­
erty, see CJEU, Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd Sanofi- Aventis Deutschland GmbH v DEMO, C­ 414/11, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:520 = GRUR Int. 2013, 895.
13 CJEU, Daiichi Sankyo et al. v DEMO, C­ 414/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:520 = GRUR Int. 2013, 895, para. 
45 et seq.
14 Idem paras. 53, 60.
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virtue of competence relating to the field of the internal market. On the other 
hand, any act adopted in this respect will have to comply with the rules concern­
ing the availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights under TRIPS.15 
This finding also is in line with Art. 207(6) TFEU stipulating that the allocation 
of competences effected by this provision shall not lead to harmonization of leg­
islative provisions of the Member States in so far as the Treaties of the European 
Union exclude such harmonization.
The decision Daiichi Sankyo et al. /DEMO also marks a turning point in the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence with respect to the question whether Member States are 
principally competent to give direct effect to provisions of TRIPS, which in turn 
would enable national courts to directly apply those provisions. While in the 
judgment in Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos the CJEU answered this 
question in the affirmative,16 the judgment in Daiichi Sankyo et al. /DEMO must 
be read to exclude any direct effect of TRIPS.17 The courts of the Member States 
are barred from any discrete interpretation of TRIPS, aside from actes claires/
actes éclairés. Member States are bound by the CJEU’s interpretation of TRIPS, 
which favors the right holder according to its primary objective to strengthen and 
harmonize the protection of intellectual property rights on a worldwide scale.18 It 
further emphasizes the objective of TRIPS to reduce distortions of international 
trade by ensuring the effective and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights.19 These aims again naturally emphasize the position of the right holder.
In summary, TRIPS does not have any direct harmonizing effect on the law 
of the Member States, a result, which is in accordance with Art. 207(6) TFEU.
b) Standards established by TRIPS
While there is no direct effect of the TRIPS in the Member States and, thus, 
individual persons are barred from relying on TRIPS provisions in court, the 
principles laid down in it are to be observed by way of an interpretation of the 
applicable legal rules.20
In order to reduce distortions in international trade, the TRIPS identifies ef­
fective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade­ related intellectual 
15 Idem paras. 59, 60.
16 CJEU, Merck Genéricos  – Produtos Farmacêuticos, C­ 431/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:496 = GRUR 
2008, 55, paras. 47 et seq.
17 Liebenau/Uhrich/Zech, 2014, 107, 111/112; Benkard/Ullmann/Tochtermann, PatG, Internatio­
naler Teil, para. 79.
18 Liebenau/Uhrich/Zech, 2014, 107, 112.
19 CJEU, Daiichi Sankyo et al. v DEMO, C­ 414/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:520 = GRUR Int. 2013, 895, para. 
58; CJEU, Schieving- Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld, C­ 89/99, ECLI:EU: C: 2001: 438 
= GRUR Int. 2002, 41, para. 36.
20 Liebenau/Uhrich/Zech, 2014, 107, 112; Benkard/Ullmann/Tochtermann, PatG, Internationaler 
Teil, para. 79.
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property rights as one of the primary concerns. In doing so, however, it explicitly 
acknowledges the differences of national legal systems.21
This underlines that – albeit strengthening intellectual property rights by pro­
moting a minimum harmonization on the international level – TRIPS does not 
interfere with national legislative competences. States are free to implement the 
principles established therein in their national legal orders. TRIPS notably pro­
vides for guidance.
Thus, with respect to the question of proportionality presently discussed, re­
gard is to be had to the guidelines established in TRIPS. The most obvious start­
ing point is a reading of Art. 44 TRIPS on injunctions. It states: “The judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to order a party to desist from an infringe­
ment […].”
In the current context, it is particularly noteworthy that Art. 44 TRIPS on in­
junctions does not stipulate any sort of requirement of proportionality as a pre­
condition for granting an injunction.22 At the same time it can be safely assumed 
that if the drafters of TRIPS had intended to institute such a precondition, they 
would have explicitly done so. This can be deduced from a simple comparison: 
Art. 46 on Other Remedies explicitly mentions a “need for proportionality” in 
considering such requests.23
Looking further in the TRIPS provisions, Art. 41 para. 2 on General Obliga-
tions, may seem as an adequate basis for a requirement of proportionality be­
cause it calls for “fair and equitable procedures concerning the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights”. However, albeit being a general statement, it merely 
pertains to the (court) procedure, i. e. of granting an injunction, but may not be 
read as a parameter to take a proportionate decision on the merits. This finding 
is underlined by Art. 42 on Fair and Equitable Procedures, which again focuses 
solely on procedural aspects.
However, provisions concentrating on procedural aspects cannot genuinely 
prescribe a proportionality requirement with respect to the grant of injunctions, 
if and because such a requirement would substantially limit the exclusivity right 
conferred by a  patent.24 Accordingly, any such requirement must be rooted in 
material provisions, i. e. the rule on the scope of the exclusivity right.
In general, the rights conferred by a  patent are described in Art. 28 TRIPS and 
neighboring provisions. TRIPS does not actually prescribe an absolute exclusiv­
ity right, but rather allows for exceptions in order to accommodate the different 
21 TRIPS, Preamble para. 2 lit. (c); CJEU, Daiichi Sankyo et al. v DEMO, C­ 414/11, ECLI: EU: C: 2013: 
520 = GRUR Int. 2013, 895, para. 58.
22 Ohly, GRUR Int. 2008, 787, 797.
23 “In considering such requests, the need for proportionality between the seriousness of the in­
fringement and the remedies ordered as well as the interests of third parties shall be taken into 
account.”
24 In this sense Ohly, GRUR Int. 2008, 787, 797: “[…] a limitation of the injunction would touch the 
core of the intellectual property right […]”; Osterrieth, GRUR 2018, 985, 987.
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interests concerned when it comes to the functioning of the  patent system as a 
whole.25 However, Art. 30 TRIPS may not be construed in a broad manner al­
lowing for individual exceptions to the exclusivity right of the patentee, which 
are to be granted by judges deciding on the enforcement of the  patent. It reads:
“Exceptions to Rights Conferred
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a  patent, provided 
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the  patent and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the  patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties.”
Despite the open wording several reasons speak against a broad reading of this 
provision.
First, its wording clearly addresses the extent of the  patent as a substantive 
(exclusivity) right. It describes “exceptions to the rights conferred”, thus poten­
tially limiting their scope. Addressing “members” also leads to the assumption 
that the exceptions should only be granted by TRIPS Member States’ legislators 
as opposed to the judiciary.
Second, Art. 30 TRIPS prescribes clear preconditions: exceptions must be 
(1) “limited”, (2) “do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
 patent” and (3) “do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
 patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”26 A gen­
eral proportionality requirement for an injunction would already be problematic 
with respect to the precondition that the exception has to be “limited”. In order 
to determine the meaning of this precondition, guidance can be sought from the 
Panel report of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the case of Canada- 
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, where the panel was concerned 
with the interpretation of Art. 30 TRIPS. While DSB rulings strictly are binding 
only on the parties to the dispute,27 they can still serve as guidance.
According to Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, the term 
“limited” is to be given a rather narrow interpretation in the context of the 
phrase “limited exceptions” since the word “exception” by itself connotes a lim­
ited derogation. Hence it must be read in a manner to cause only a small (fur­
ther) diminution of the rights in question.28 The Panel further concluded that the 
term had to be read literally, focusing on the extent to which legal rights have 
been curtailed.29 It held that to determine whether a particular exception con­
stitutes a limited exception, the extent to which the  patent owner’s rights have 
25 Busche/Stoll /Wiebe­ v. Saint- André/Taşdelen, TRIPs, 2nd ed., Heymanns 2013, Art. 30 para. 2.
26 Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, para. 7.20.
27 There is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement, reports of panels are not binding 
precedents for other disputes: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_
cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm (last accessed: 16 July 2019).
28 Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, para. 7.30.
29 Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, paras. 7.30 et seq.
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been curtailed must be measured.30 With respect to the provisions of the Cana­
dian Patent Act on the protection of pharmaceutical products, such measure of 
the  patent owner’s rights could reasonably be undertaken because it concerned 
a very specific and narrow case. And even in this scenario, that Panel upon con­
ducting this measurement concluded that the provision in question did not sat­
isfy the first precondition of a “limited exception”.31
Considering that the DSB­ Panel could not convince itself of the limited char­
acter of the provision in question despite such a specific and narrow scenario, it 
is assumed that it would neither do so with respect to a rule subjecting the exer­
cise of the rights conferred upon the  patent holder to a general proportionality 
assessment. Such exception could by no means be described as “limited” as it 
would be applied without differentiation to any type of the  patent holder’s rights. 
This would run contrary to the clear­ cut preconditions set out by Art. 30 TRIPS.
It may be argued that TRIPS neither prescribes a proportionality requirement 
of its own nor would it welcome such a requirement in the national  patent law of 
a signatory. An unlimited exception to the rights of the  patent holder is simply 
not covered by Art. 30 TRIPS.
Of course, this does not imply that a proportionality assessment concerning 
injunctions is generally barred under TRIPS. A statutory provision to this effect 
remains possible, but in order to comply with the standards established in Art. 30 
TRIPS, it must be strictly limited in scope.
2. The Enforcement Directive of 2004
A further legal source to be contemplated is the European Enforcement Direc­
tive. It was adopted in 2004 with the intention to foster the success of the inter­
nal market by enhancing the protection of intellectual property rights. This is 
regarded as central not only for promoting innovation and creativity, but also 
for developing employment and improving competitiveness.32 With the inten­
tion to ensure that the substantive law on intellectual property, which is nowa­
days largely part of the acquis communautaire, is applied effectively throughout 
the Union,33 it also sets the stage for an effective enforcement of  patent rights.
Just as TRIPs the Enforcement Directive does not expressly stipulate any pro­
portionality requirement for granting an injunction. The conditions for granting 
an injunction explicitly are left for the national legal orders to determine.34 It is 
30 Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, para. 7.32.
31 Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, para. 7.38.
32 Recital 1 Enforcement Directive.
33 Recital 3 Enforcement Directive.
34 Art. 3(1) Enforcement Directive: “Member states shall provide for the measures […]”; CJEU, 
L’Oréal SA and Others v. eBay International AG and Others, C­ 324/09, EU:C:2011:474 = MMR 
2011, 596, para 135.
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to be said in advance that the discussion on proportionality regarding copyright 
infringement, which is led on the level of EU law and has already been covered 
by several decisions of the CJEU, is not to be transposed to  patent law. Copy­
right – albeit being an intellectual property right – is fundamentally different 
from a  patent, already because it emerges ipso iure with the creation of the copy­
righted work while a  patent right needs to be registered in order to be protected. 
Hence, the incentives to seek  patent protection are fundamentally different from 
those of copyright protection. This must naturally be taken into account in any 
(potential) proportionality assessment concerning injunctions with regard to 
one or the other.
Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the discussion on 
proportionality with respect to copyright remedies is far more developed, in 
particular because of several landmark decisions by the CJEU in the cases of 
Promusicae,35 L’Oréal,36 SABAM37 and Telekabel.38 In the case of Coty Germany/
Sparkasse Magdeburg, the CJEU extended its reasoning to Union trade mark 
law39 and in Bastei Lübbe/Strotzer reiterated it recently.40 Here, the proportion­
ality debate is centered around the balancing of fundamental rights protected by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This development is problematic, however, 
in light of the fact that most interests concerned can easily be broken down to 
their roots in fundamental rights.
It cannot be ruled out that the CJEU may extend this reasoning to  patent law 
because here the fundamental right to an effective remedy and, ultimately, the 
fundamental right to intellectual property are at stake as well. However, EU sec­
ondary law such as the Enforcement Directive already is the result of a careful 
balancing of fundamental rights. It is therefore problematic to conduct a separate 
balancing in each particular case, when the application of those instruments is 
concerned.
As of now, the differences in the fields of intellectual property require to sepa­
rately assess the field of  patent law from the field of copyright law.
35 CJEU, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU, C­ 275/06, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:54 = MMR 2008, 227.
36 CJEU, L’Oréal SA and Others v. eBay International AG and Others, C­ 324/09, EU:C:2011:474 = 
MMR 2011, 596.
37 CJEU, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 
C 70/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771 = GRUR 2012, 265 and Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Compon-
isten en Uitgevers (SABAM) v. Netlog NV, C­ 360/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85 = MMR 2012, 334.
38 CJEU, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, Wega Filmproduktions-
gesellschaft mbH, C 314/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:192 = GRUR 2014, 468. For a detailed discussion of 
these decisions see Fischman Afori, IIC 2014, 889, 901 et seq.
39 CJEU, Coty Germany GmbH/Sparkasse Magdeburg, C­ 580/13 ECLI:EU:C:2015:485  =  GRUR 
2015, 894, paras. 33 et seq.
40 CJEU, Bastei Lübbe GmbH & Co. KG/Michael Strotzer, C­ 149/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:841 = GRUR 
2018, 1234, para. 43 et seq.
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a) Structure
Considering the material provisions of the Directive it is noteworthy that propor­
tionality in fact is mentioned in several instances, albeit not explicitly in Art. 11 
on injunctions.
A frequent argument is, however, that a proportionality assessment is man­
dated by Art. 3(2) Enforcement Directive,41 which contains a general statement 
that the remedies prescribed by the Directive shall “also” be proportionate. Prima 
facie, this wording seems to be unambiguous as to the effect that this require­
ment shall apply to all remedies mentioned in the following, including injunc­
tions. Yet, despite the general statement, a number of the following provisions 
explicitly set out proportionality requirements, while the particular provision 
on injunctions does not: this is the case for Art. 10(3) Enforcement Directive. 
It prescribes a need for proportionality in considering a request for corrective 
(provisional) measures. The same holds true for Art. 8(1) Enforcement Directive 
requiring a Claimant’s request for information to be justified and proportionate. 
This exemplifies that if the drafters of the Enforcement Directive had intended to 
subject the granting of injunctions to a proportionality requirement they would 
have explicitly done so.
Furthermore, Art. 12 Enforcement Directive addresses the proportionality of 
measures against the infringer in a particularly explicit manner. It provides for a 
very specific instrument. It opens to judicial authorities the possibility (“may” in­
stead of “shall”) of ordering pecuniary compensation instead of an injunction in 
cases where the infringement was committed unintentionally and without negli­
gence. The further requirement is that the execution of the measures in question 
would cause disproportionate harm to the person held liable. The provision also 
applies to injunctions.42 Apparently, it does not constitute a general proportional­
ity requirement but rather an exemption clause targeting faultless infringement.43 
This shows that the drafters very carefully considered the aspect of proportion­
ality of injunctive relief. Yet they chose not to insert a general exception. In fact, 
it applies only to very narrow cases of faultless behavior. For these cases, they 
specifically prescribe pecuniary compensation instead of an injunction. Hence, 
even in these narrow scenarios, the Directive does not call for proportionality as 
a requirement for the order of an injunction in itself, but instead merely proposes 
a remedy in replacement.
41 Ohly GRUR Int. 2008, 796, 797; Hofmann, WRP 2018, 1, 5 et seq.; Osterrieth, GRUR 2018, 985, 
988.
42 Recital 25 explicitly links the alternative measure of pecuniary compensation to injunctions. 
This together with the placement of Art. 12 behind Art. 10 on Corrective measures and behind 
Art. 11 on Injunctions lets it be assumed that the provision applies to both.
43 Ahrens/McGuire, ModellG, § 56 Buch 1, para. 3.
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b) Wording of Art. 3(2) Enforcement Directive
By no means may Art. 3(2) Enforcement Directive be read as broadly as to pro­
vide for a general precondition to any cease and desist claim of the rightholder.44
Further it is to be assumed that Art. 3(2) Enforcement Directive is directed 
at Member States implementing the Enforcement Directive (Art. 3(1): “Member 
States shall provide for measures […]”) and not at individuals invoking propor­
tionality in a particular case. Similarly, Art. 3(2) Enforcement Directive by its 
wording makes a clear distinction: while the first half sentence “Those measures 
[…] shall […]” is directed at the preceding paragraph 1, the second half sentence 
explicitly addresses the application of the remedies. In the application, courts 
have to be careful not to create barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for 
safeguards against the abuse of remedies. Proportionality, however, addressed in 
the first half sentence, clearly is to be observed at the level of the national legisla­
tor, not at the level of application by national courts.45
c) Objectives
A national rule on a “remedy” necessary to ensure the enforcement of intellec­
tual property rights must meet the standards prescribed by Art. 3(2) Enforce­
ment Directive. Hence, a national rule allowing for an application of the propor­
tionality requirement, such as to exclude injunctions, must always be balanced 
against the effectiveness and dissuasiveness of the remedy.46 Rules of national law 
implementing the Enforcement Directive must be designed in such a way that 
the objective pursued by the directive may be achieved.47 Already, the standards 
of effectiveness and dissuasiveness exemplify the objective48 of the Directive to 
strengthen the protection of the rightholder of an intellectual property right.
According to the Union law principle of effectiveness, in order to safeguard all 
rights individuals derive from Union law, rules established by Member States to 
this effect must be designed in a manner that their exercise is not rendered virtu­
ally impossible or excessively difficult.49
In addition, by particularly stressing the dissuasiveness of the remedies imple­
mented by national legislators, it becomes clear that the directive intends them 
44 Ohly GRUR Int. 2008, 796, 797; Hofmann, WRP 2018, 1, 5 et seq.; Osterrieth, GRUR 2018, 985, 
988.
45 Reetz/Pecnard/Fruscalzo/van der Velden/Marfé, GRUR Int. 2015, 210, 211; in CJEU, L’Oréal, 
C­ 324/09, EU:C:2011:474 = MMR 2011, 596, paras. 138–140 the CJEU practices this delineation 
as well.
46 BGH GRUR 2016, 1031, para. 50 – Wärmetauscher; Ohly, GRUR Int. 2008, 787, 797.
47 CJEU, L’Oréal, C­ 324/09, EU:C:2011:474 = MMR 2011, 596, para. 136.
48 Recitals 2 and 3 Enforcement Directive.
49 CJEU, J. van der Weerd et. al., joint Cases C­ 222/05 to C­225/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:318 para. 28; 
CJEU, L’Oréal, C­ 324/09, EU:C:2011:474 = MMR 2011, 596, para. 136.
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to be powerful enough to not only provide for a compensatory effect after an 
infringement but also for a deterrent effect to prevent infringements. A general 
proportionality assessment weighing all interests concerned in the particular 
case can likely not meet these standards.
Finally, it may be argued that it would not meet the standards of TRIPS. The 
Enforcement Directive mandates that the standards are observed by the Mem­
ber States in the implementation of the Directive.50 Also, the provisions of the 
Enforcement Directive should be given an interpretation respecting the obliga­
tions under TRIPS. As laid out above, a general proportionality assessment be­
fore granting an injunction would amount to a restriction of the  patent holder’s 
exclusivity right. Such restriction must meet the standards provided for in Art. 30 
TRIPS, calling for exceptions to be “limited”. A general proportionality require­
ment in the granting of an injunction would have to be considered unlimited 
because it requires a weighing of all interests concerned on a case by case basis. 
It would make it unpredictable for the  patent holder whether it will be possible 
to effectively enforce the exclusivity right against the infringer. This violates the 
principle of legal certainty.
3. The European Patent Convention
Naturally, the EPC does not set out any requirements for claiming an injunction. 
According to Art. 63 para. 3 EPC “Any infringement of a European  patent shall 
be dealt with by national law.”
II. An overview: European substantive  patent laws
According to the findings presented above, national legal provisions on injunc­
tions must on the one hand comply with the preconditions set out in Art. 11 
Enforcement Directive but must also meet the standards of Art. 3(2) Enforce­
ment Directive. Hence, legislation must be proportionate, effective and dissua­
sive while courts in its application must avoid to create barriers to legitimate 
trade and must provide safeguards against abuse of rights. This will be tested for 
legislation and jurisprudence in Germany and briefly compared with selected 
European jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom. The overview will be 
complemented with the relevant provisions from the UPCA.
50 Art. 2(3)(b) and Recitals 4 and 5 Enforcement Directive.
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1. Patent injunctions in German law
Sec. 139 German Patent Act grants a right to claim an injunction against anyone 
using a patented invention contrary to Sec. 9 or 10 German Patent Act. Sec. 9 
describes the scope of application of  patent protection in terms of granting the 
 patent holder a right to use the patented invention as well as a right to exclude 
all others from such use without his/her consent.
It should be mentioned that a claim for an injunction is rooted in substantive 
and not procedural law in Germany. Hence, if the preconditions of Sec. 139 Ger­
man Patent Act are met, an injunction must be granted. There is no procedural 
leeway for judges to abstain from granting an injunction on the basis of propor­
tionality considerations.
However, it is an ongoing discussion in Germany whether an injunction 
should be subjected to a general proportionality assessment despite a positive 
finding of  patent infringement.51 Certain interest groups lobby for an amend­
ment of the provisions presently in force.52 It is considered disproportionate to 
allow the holder of a  patent concerning a minor component (i. e. concerning a 
computer chip) of a much more complex system (i. e. a car) to enforce its right 
by e. g. stopping the distribution of the whole complex product.53 To back up 
this argument, the standards allegedly imposed by the Enforcement Directive 
are frequently invoked.54
However, a close analysis of the German  patent law reveals that it meets the 
standards of the Enforcement Directive as identified in the foregoing:
First, it may not be argued on the basis of Art. 3(2) of the Enforcement Direc­
tive that Sec. 139 German Patent Act should be complemented with a general 
proportionality requirement because Art. 3(2) Enforcement Directive must be 
read against Art. 30 TRIPS. This provision calls for exceptions to the exclusivity 
right to be “limited” (see supra). Second, Germany has not implemented Art. 12 
of the Enforcement Directive calling for an alternative measure of pecuniary 
compensation in cases of disproportionality (see supra). However, as its non­ 
binding wording indicates (“Member States may provide that”), it was not im­
perative to implement this provision.55 Under German  patent law, only the claims 
for destruction and recall of products are subjected to an explicit proportionality 
requirement in Sec. 140a para. 3 German Patent Act.
51 See other articles included in this volume; Lüthi, GRUR Int. 2019, 352; Hofmann, NJW 2018, 
1290; Osterrieth, GRUR 2018, 985.
52 Interested circles were invited to the German Federal Ministry of Justice on 20 May 2019 to dis­
cuss the matter of “Injunctions in the context of SEPs and complex products”.
53 See references in Lüthi, GRUR Int. 2019, 352; Hofmann, NJW 2018, 1290; Osterrieth, GRUR 2018, 
985.
54 See supra, note 42.
55 Begr. RegE­ DurchsetzungsG, BT­ Drucks. 16/5048, p. 32.
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On the other hand, in German  patent law, proportionality in awarding sub­
stantive claims is ensured in a way to meet the requirements of Art. 3(2) Enforce­
ment Directive. First and foremost, every interference with the constitutional 
guarantee of ownership (Art. 14 German Basic Law) (including  patent owner­
ship) has to be justified against the backdrop of the proportionality principle.56 
In general civil law it is implemented by virtue of the good faith principle. A po­
tential infringer may raise the defense of disproportionality against an injunc­
tion by invoking good faith under Sec.  242 German Civil Code (BGB).57 For 
example, the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) held in its Wärmetauscher decision 
of 2016 that an immediate enforcement of an injunction – even considering the 
legitimate interests of the  patent holder vis- à- vis the infringer – may constitute 
a disproportionate severity that could not be justified by the exclusivity of the 
 patent right and therefore was considered to be contrary to good faith. The court 
defined this standard in order to consider the granting of a grace period for the 
infringer to accomplish transition and elimination measures.58
However, the criteria for assessing proportionality of a grace period had not 
yet been established by case law for  patent cases. The BGH therefore drew from 
criteria used in the area of competition law as well as from legal literature. In this 
respect it is to be stressed that the BGH has defined high thresholds, accounting 
for the very nature of  patent infringement. Since the infringement was a direct 
consequence by i. e. the manufacture of a protected product it is a necessary con­
sequence of an injunction that the infringer would have to cease production. The 
consequential hardship is to be accepted. A limitation of the effects of a  patent 
was only justified if and because an absolute prohibition was an intolerable hard­
ship (“unzumutbar”).59 On the backdrop of this very strict standard, interest­
ingly, the BGH ruled in Wärmetauscher that in the particular circumstances of 
the case it was not justified to grant a grace period.60
From the point of view of the statutory law, proportionality in extreme cases is 
ensured by the principle of good faith radiating into  patent law. From the point 
of view of the application of the law, judges undertake a proportionality assess­
ment where for example abusive behavior is invoked or where there is intoler­
able hardship.
Furthermore, to determine whether the German  patent law meets the stand­
ards of Art. 3(2) Enforcement Directive, it is insufficient to look at isolated provi­
sions. A guarantee for proportionality may also be derived from the functioning 
56 Maunz/Dürig­ Papier/Shrivani, GG, Art. 14 para. 694.
57 Benkard­ Grabinski/Zülch, PatG, § 139 para. 26: Infringer may raise defenses of fraudulent be­
havior or unlawful exercise of a right; Ohly, GRUR Int. 2008, 787, 795 et seq.
58 BGH GRUR 2016, 1031 – Wärmetauscher, para. 41.
59 BGH GRUR 2016, 1031 – Wärmetauscher, para. 45; see the application of a similar standard in 
BGH GRUR 2018, 292 – Produkte der Wundversorgung, para. 26; Hofmann, NJW 2018, 1290, 
1292 with further references.
60 BGH GRUR 2016, 1031 – Wärmetauscher, paras. 51 et seq.
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of the  patent system as a whole. In Germany, judgements ordering injunctions are 
only declared provisionally enforceable against security (Sec. 709 German Code 
of Civil Procedure). The security is meant to cover possible damage claims of the 
debtor for example in cases where the judgment of the lower instance court is re­
versed by the appellate court (Sec. 717 para. 2 German Code of Civil Procedure). 
The amount the claimant has to provide may be considerable, especially for judg­
ments of injunctions in cases of intellectual property infringement.61 It must not 
only cover legal costs but also possible damages the debtor might incur because 
of the provisional enforcement of the judgment. These might be considerably 
higher than the overall interest of the claimant in the injunction.62 Hence, the 
amount of security might deter the claimant from seeking provisional enforce­
ment or at least to evaluate its chances carefully.
Also, an application by the defendant for a temporary stay of compulsory en­
forcement according to Sec. 719, 707 German Code of Civil Procedure may be 
filed on the ground – inter alia – that the enforcement would entail a disadvan­
tage that it is impossible to compensate or remedy. In the assessment whether a 
stay can be granted, courts weigh all interests concerned in the particular case.63
These procedural mechanisms may serve as further examples of how propor­
tionality of injunctions is ensured by the functioning of the legal system as such.
2. Patent injunctions in other European jurisdictions
When comparing these results with other European jurisdictions, the dividing 
line at first glance seems to be drawn between the continental European legal or­
ders and the Anglo­Saxon legal tradition.
In a recent study, Reetz, Pecnard, Fruscalzo, van der Velden and Marfé have 
concluded that in none of the continental European countries under considera­
tion (Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands) either the power of the courts to grant 
 patent injunctions or the substantive cease and desist claims were limited by a 
proportionality assessment.64 The only limitations were imposed by the princi­
ple of market freedom – guaranteed by the rules on the internal market and the 
Unions competition policy (Art. 101, 102 TFEU) – and the prohibition of abuse of 
rights. None of the states implemented Art. 12 Enforcement Directive.65
On the other hand, the UK legal order seems more prone to conduct a pro­
portionality assessment in the single case. In the Anglo­ Saxon legal tradition, 
a remedy such as an injunction is not a legal consequence of substantive law 
61 Cepl/Voß­ Lunze, Prozesskommentar zum Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, 2nd ed. 2018, § 709 
para. 8.
62 Idem.
63 Cepl/Voß­ Lunze, Prozesskommentar zum Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, § 707 paras. 11 et seq.
64 Reetz/Pecnard/Fruscalzo/van der Velden/Marfé, GRUR Int. 2015, 210, 211.
65 Idem.
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(strict law) but an application of the law of equity. English courts see themselves 
as being authorized on the basis of their equity law tradition not to grant a cease 
and desist order in the event of disproportionality.66 However, a closer look at 
the requirements applied to the proportionality assessment reveals that it is con­
sidered only for rare and exceptional cases.67 As Judge Pumfrey put it in the case 
of Navitaire Inc v. EasyJet Airline Co Ltd (No. 2):
“[…] the grant or refusal of a final injunction is not merely a matter of the balance of conveni­
ence. Justice requires that the court […] remembers that if the effect of the grant of an injunc­
tion is not oppressive the defendant cannot buy his way out of it, even if the price, objectively 
ascertained, would be modest. My understanding of the word ‘oppressive’ in this context is 
that the effect of the grant of the injunction would be grossly disproportionate to the right pro­
tected. The word ‘grossly’ avoids any suggestion that all that has to be done is to strike a balance 
of convenience.”68
However, in recent years, English courts have given Art. 3(2) Enforcement Di­
rective and its reading by the CJEU more room: proportionality may require to 
balance intellectual property rights against other rights concerned.69 However, 
in this approach, the courts rely on the CJEU jurisprudence presented above, 
which focuses on copyright. What is more, in the recent case of HTC Corpora-
tion v. Nokia Corporation on  patent infringement, the EWHC drew a clear line 
by stating that in the concrete circumstances
“[…] refusal of an injunction would be tantamount to imposing a compulsory licence on Nokia 
in the circumstances where HTC could not obtain a compulsory licence by the proper route.”70
This may serve as an indication that English courts as well apply high standards 
to the refusal of an injunction for proportionality considerations.71 Presumably, 
the results of a proportionality assessment under the continental European and 
the Anglo­ Saxon legal orders are not too far apart.
3. Patent injunctions according to UPCA
Even though the prospects of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) are still some­
what unpredictable, it is worthwhile to take a look at the UPCA and the Rules of 
66 Reetz/Pecnard/Fruscalzo/van der Velden/Marfé, GRUR Int. 2015, 210, 214.
67 Idem.
68 Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Co Ltd (No. 2) [2005] EWHC 282 (Ch), [2006] RPC 4; for a de­
tailed presentation of the UK jurisprudence see the article of Alexander, QC, in this volume at 
p. 279; cf. also BGH GRUR 2016, 1031 – Wärmetauscher, para. 50; Reetz/Pecnard/Fruscalzo/van 
der Velden/Marfé, GRUR Int. 2015, 210, 214; Tilmann, Unified Patent Protection, Art. 63 UPCA, 
para. 27.
69 HTC Corporation v. Nokia Corporation [2013] EWHC 3378 (Pat) (03 December 2013) with fur­
ther references.
70 Arnold J in HTC Corporation v. Nokia Corporation [2013] EWHC 3378 (Pat) (03 December 
2013).
71 See also the article of Alexander, QC, in this volume at p. 279.
Dies ist urheberrechtlich geschütztes Material. Bereitgestellt von: Universit?t Mannheim, 04.03.2020
272 Lea Tochtermann
Procedure (RoP) – after all they are a body of harmonized European Law. Experts 
in  patent litigation from all over Europe have discussed for decades in order to 
establish a common ground for  patent litigation before the UPC and tried to cre­
ate a kind of “best of all worlds”.
But yet again, Art. 63 UPCA on injunctions does not feature a proportional­
ity requirement:
“Permanent injunctions
(1) Where a decision is taken finding an infringement of a  patent, the Court may grant an in­
junction against the infringer aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement. The 
Court may also grant such injunction against an intermediary whose services are being used by 
a third party to infringe a  patent.”
In fact, Art. 63 UPCA is a literal implementation of Art. 11 Enforcement Direc­
tive.
a) No procedural discretion
A preliminary remark has to be made about the legal nature of the provision. It 
clearly reflects the continental European understanding that a procedural order 
of an injunction is the result of a substantive cease and desist claim against the 
infringer. In particular, there is no procedural discretion of the judges not to 
grant an injunction if it considers it to be disproportionate. Therefore, any coun­
ter­ arguments against a cease and desist order must be asserted under substan­
tive law.72
But would Art. 63 UPCA give room to such counter­ arguments? There has 
been some discussion whether the wording “may grant” still confers discretion 
upon the judges not to grant the injunction despite a clear infringement. The pre­
dominant opinion rejects this point of view though.73 Hence, if the court, after 
having considered all counter­arguments, finds that there is an infringement, 
an injunction – if claimed – is imperative. Arguing on the award of the substan­
tive claim, the defendant has ample opportunity to raise its counter­ arguments 
against infringement.74
Instead, the wording “may” is read in a way as to give legal authority (power) 
to the UPC to grant a cease and desist order and also to abstain from doing so, 
if the substantive claim appears to be unfounded from a substantive  patent law 
perspective.75
72 Tilmann, Unified Patent Protection, Art. 63 UPCA, paras. 27 et seq.
73 Reetz/Pecnard/Ruscalzo/van der Velden/Marfé, GRUR Int. 2015, 210, 216; Tilmann, Unified 
Patent Protection, Art. 63 UPCA, para. 29; dissenting i.a. Osterrieth, GRUR 2018, 985, 988/989; 
Schröer, GRUR Int. 2013, 1102, 1107 f. 
74 Tilmann, Unified Patent Protection, Art. 63 UPCA, paras. 29 et seq.
75 Tilmann, Unified Patent Protection, Art. 63 UPCA, paras. 20 and 29 et seq.
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It might count as another argument against procedural discretion that the 
special provision on pecuniary relief instead of an injunction of Art. 12 Enforce­
ment Directive has not been implemented in the UPCA. Up until the 16th Draft 
the RoP still contained a rule along the lines of Art. 12 Enforcement Directive, but 
this option for judges in the application of the law was deleted from later drafts.
b) No general substantive law defense of disproportionality
This leads to the question whether the defendant can claim disproportionality as 
an argument based on substantive law?
The legal basis for a cease and desist claim with respect to European Patents 
with Unitary Effect (EPUEs) is Art. 5(1) EPUE­ Reg.76 combined with Art. 25 
UPCA. Again, neither of these provisions features a proportionality requirement. 
As argued in the foregoing, this would run counter the provisions of Art. 3(2) 
Enforcement Directive read in light of Art. 30 TRIPS.
The remaining question is whether a defense on proportionality may be raised 
under the applicable national law according to Art. 24(1)(e) and (2) UPCA. The 
UPCA and the EPUE referring to the Enforcement Directive are comprehensive 
and binding on the issue of proportionality under  patent law. None of the directly 
relevant provisions contains a proportionality requirement concerning injunc­
tions. On the other hand, several other provisions of the UPCA explicitly hold 
elements of a proportionality assessment. Some examples are Art. 60 UPCA on 
preserving evidence, Art. 62 UPCA on provisional measures, which expressly 
calls for a balancing of interests the Court is required to undertake in a discretion 
decision (Art. 62(2) UPCA). Hence, the drafters of the UPCA took a deliberate 
choice not to include a proportionality requirement in the rule on injunctions in 
Art. 63 UPCA. There is no room for the application of national  patent law.
As for non­ patent law defenses, on the other hand, such as the civil law objec­
tion based on “good faith”, these should be allowed on the basis of national law. 
As it will mostly concern general principles of civil law, their scope presumably 
is going to be limited and might be quite similar in many Member States.
III. Proportionality de lege ferenda?
1. Argument concerning the functioning of the  patent system as a whole
Finally, in light of these findings, the question whether the existing law should 
be amended in order to include a general proportionality assessment must be 
addressed.
76 Tilmann, Unified Patent Protection, Art. 63 UPCA, para. 17.
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First and foremost, if it was drafted in rather general and broad terms, it would 
run counter the requirements of Art. 30 TRIPS (see supra).
Another argument may be construed taking into consideration the impact of 
a general proportionality assessment on the  patent system as a whole. As an ad­
ditional requirement for granting an injunction it may be hazardous. Without 
specific standards defined by law it could severely disturb the balance enshrined 
in the  patent system.
In a nutshell,77  patent law is driven by the underlying idea that the technol­
ogy behind the patents shall be made available to the general public in order 
to further technical knowledge of the society as a whole (theory of disclosure). 
This is supposed to reduce the necessary investment in the research of new tech­
nologies and to target these investments better. Disclosing existing knowledge 
allows others to build upon this knowledge and to develop it further. The risk 
of parallel inventions – generating double costs – is reduced and the society as 
a whole can steadily continue to innovate. Thus, disclosure is an efficient means 
of innovation.
While this evidently is desirable from the point of view of the society as a 
whole, the prospect of being used and copied is not similarly appealing to in­
novators. Accordingly, there must be an incentive to disclose their innovations 
(incentive effect). This is where the  patent system comes in. Innovators/Patent 
holders are granted a temporary monopoly on the use of the invention. By virtue 
of their exclusive right, they alone may decide who is allowed to use the patented 
invention. Patent laws clearly define the scope and the restrictions of the  patent 
right as a temporary monopoly to assure it does not go overboard. But within 
these limits, the injunction is central to the effective enforcement of this right, 
bearing much more deterrent potential than i. e. the damage remedy because it 
has the power to exclude competitors from the market.
Introducing a general proportionality requirement for any injunction would 
equal an unwritten restriction of the  patent right as such. In essence it would mir­
ror a compulsory license.78 However, the preconditions of a compulsory license 
are set out in detail in Sec. 24 German Patent Act. To put the grant of an injunc­
tion in case of an infringement into question by applying a vague proportional­
ity requirement would in addition massively undermine legal certainty. It would 
put the deliberate choice of the legislator to balance the interests concerned into 
question.
The existing system, namely the automatic grant of an injunction in case of 
infringement, is not overly detrimental to the potential infringer.79 Competitors 
77 See also Ohly, GRUR Int. 2008, 787, 791 et seq.
78 For the comparison see Osterrieth, GRUR 2018, 985, 988.
79 Different view expressed by Hofmann in this volume at p. 249, Osterrieth, GRUR 2018, 985 and 
in Country report for Germany, AIPPI Q 219: Haft/Nack/Lunze/Heusch/Schohe/Joachim, 
GRUR Int. 2011, 927.
Dies ist urheberrechtlich geschütztes Material. Bereitgestellt von: Universit?t Mannheim, 04.03.2020
275Injunctions in European Patent Law
have ample opportunity to attack unjustified patents in opposition and nullity 
proceedings.
However, should the legislator consider an amendment of the existing  patent 
law with respect to proportionality, this must meet the high standards of Art. 30 
TRIPS, i. e. only provide for limited exceptions of the exclusivity right.
2. Argument from Sec. 6, 9 German Trade Secret Act
The fact that the (European) legislator is fully aware of specific rules to strike an 
acceptable compromise is underlined by the Trade Secrets Directive.80 In this 
case the German legislator followed suit and did not omit the European rule, 
but implemented it into the national Trade Secret Act. Both the European and 
the German legislation give an idea of what a proportionality requirement could 
look like.
According to Sec. 6 German Trade Secret Act, an injunction may be granted 
against an infringer for obtaining, using or disclosing a trade secret without au­
thorization according to Sec. 4 German Trade Secret Act.
All remedies under the German Trade Secret Act are subject to a proportion­
ality assessment according to Sec. 9 German Trade Secret Act.
Sec 9 (translation by the author)
“Suspension of rights in case of disproportionality
The claims under Sec. 6 to 8(1) are suspended in case their performance would be dispropor­
tionate in the particular case, especially taking into account
1. the value or other specific features of the trade secret, 
2. the measures taken to protect the trade secret, 
3. the conduct of the infringer in acquiring, using or disclosing the trade secret,
4. the impact of the unlawful use or disclosure of the trade secret,
5. the legitimate interests of the parties and the impact which the granting or rejection of the 
measures could have on the parties,
6. the legitimate interests of third parties or
7. the public interest.”
Sec.  9 is an implementation of Art. 13 of the Trade Secrets Directive, which 
equally spells out specific criteria for the proportionality assessment.
Several points have to be noted: Firstly, Sec. 9 German Trade Secret Act works 
on the assumption that an infringement is positively found. Only as an exception 
in particular cases, remedies following from the infringement may be excluded 
if their enforcement would be disproportionate. This underlines the exceptional 
character of the provision.81
80 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the 
protection of undisclosed know­ how and business information (trade secrets) against their un­
lawful acquisition, use and disclosure.
81 For a more detailed analysis see L. Tochtermann, WRP 2019, 688.
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Secondly, in order to guide the proportionality assessment, the provision sets 
out a list of criteria, making it clear which points have to be taken into consid­
eration.
But is it possible that the same legislator within the same area of IP law con­
siders a proportionality assessment to be justified with respect to trade secret 
infringement but could still reject it with respect to  patent law infringement?
The answer relates to the difference between the rights granted. While the 
 patent right is an absolute right, excluding all others from the unauthorized use 
of the patented invention (exclusivity right), trade secrets are not fully­ fledged IP 
rights. They share many, but not all features of traditional IP. The object of pro­
tection is only the fact that the information is secret, not the information itself.82 
The owner of the trade secret has to take active steps to keep secrecy. The aim of 
trade secret protection is to prevent information from being leaked to the general 
public while the aim of  patent protection on the other hand is to make the inven­
tion known. Therefore, the public interest in the protection differs and accord­
ingly the proportionality assessment in both cases must similarly be different.
There is also a major difference from the perspective of the infringer. With 
regard to patents there is a public register and any person acting in the market 
has to ensure it has freedom to operate. With regard to trade secrets there is 
no means to ascertain whether knowledge gain from a third party has been le­
gally obtained. This considerably increases the risk of faultless or contributory 
infringement – in this case the proportionality may be a fair means to obtain a 
balance of interests.
With regard to  patent law injunctions, on the other hand, there is no need to 
amend the law to include a proportionality assessment. In essence, an effective 
and dissuasive injunction is the necessary compensation for the desirable disclo­
sure of the invention.
IV. Conclusion
1. TRIPS does not mandate a proportionality requirement.
2. Art. 3(2) Enforcement Directive may not be read as broadly as to provide for 
a general precondition of proportionality to any cease and desist claim of the 
rightholder. Art. 3(2) Enforcement Directive is directed at Member States imple­
menting the Enforcement Directive and is not aimed at individual applications.
3. The German statutory law complies with the requirements of the Enforcement 
Directive read in light of TRIPS, because it limits injunctions only in extreme 
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cases such as abuse of rights. Proportionality is further guaranteed by the func­
tioning of the legal system as a whole.
4. A general proportionality assessment before granting an injunction would 
amount to a restriction of the  patent holder’s exclusivity right. Such restriction 
must meet the standards provided for in Art. 30 TRIPS, calling for exceptions to 
be “limited”. A general proportionality requirement in the granting of an injunc­
tion would have to be considered unlimited because it requires a weighing of all 
interests concerned on a case by case basis. It would make it unpredictable for 
the  patent holder whether it will be possible to effectively enforce the exclusivity 
right against the infringer. This violates the principle of legal certainty.
5. A general proportionality requirement would disturb the balance of the  patent 
system as a whole.
6. If the German legislator de lege ferenda was to amend the law in order to 
include a proportionality requirement for injunctions such amendment must 
especially comply with the requirements of Art. 30 TRIPS to provide only for 
“limited” exceptions.
Zusammenfassung
Gegenstand lebhafter Diskussion in Deutschland ist derzeit die Frage, ob der Unter-
lassungsanspruch einem Verhältnismäßigkeitsvorbehalt unterworfen werden sollte. Wird 
aus  Patenten auf einzelne Komponenten gegen den Vertrieb ganzer komplexer Systeme 
vorgegangen, so wird die Rechtsdurchsetzung teilweise als unbillige Härte empfunden. 
Hier soll eine einzelfallbezogene Interessenabwägung und Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung 
Abhilfe schaffen.
Der vorliegende Beitrag argumentiert auf der Grundlage des geltenden Rechts gegen 
eine solche Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung. Aus internationalen Rechtsgrundlagen kann eine 
entsprechende Anspruchsvoraussetzung nicht abgelesen werden. Insbesondere schreibt 
Art. 3 Abs. 2 Durchsetzungsrichtlinie keine solche vor: der einschlägige Teilsatz ist an die 
Mitgliedsstaaten gerichtet und stellt keine Voraussetzungen für die konkrete Anwendung 
durch die Gerichte auf. Zudem wird die Forderung nach einer Verhältnismäßigkeit von 
Rechtsbehelfen (u. a.) dadurch einer Abwägung unterworfen, dass sie zugleich wirksam und 
abschreckend sein müssen. Dies betont die Position des Rechtsinhabers.
Das geltende deutsche Recht entspricht diesen Vorgaben, da es Verhältnismäßigkeits-
erwägungen in Grenzfällen wie etwa bei Rechtsmissbrauch zulässt und zudem durch die 
Funktionsweise der Gesamtrechtsordnung, insbesondere bei der vorläufigen Vollstreckbar-
keit von Urteilen, den Ausgleich der betroffenen Interessen sicherstellt.
Eine weitergehende Auslegung von Art. 3 Abs. 2 Durchsetzungsrichtlinie im Sinne eines 
allgemeinen Verhältnismäßigkeitsvorbehalts würde gegen Art. 30 TRIPS verstoßen, wo-
nach nur  ‚begrenzte’ Ausnahmen zu den durch das Patent gewährten Ausschließlichkeits-
rechten zu gewähren sind. Ein genereller Verhältnismäßigkeitsvorbehalt in Bezug auf die 
Gewährung eines Unterlassungsanspruchs würde dieses Kriterium schlechterdings nicht 
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erfüllen. Ein solcher würde die Durchsetzung der Rechte aus dem Patent unkalkulierbar 
machen und damit die Rechtssicherheit beeinträchtigen.
Wollte der deutsche Gesetzgeber de lege ferenda dennoch einen Verhältnismäßigkeits-
vorbehalt einziehen, so wäre die gesetzliche Regelung eng auszugestalten, und von vorn-
herein auf bestimmte vordefinierte Fallkonstellationen zu begrenzen. Nur so kann den Vor-
gaben von Art. 30 TRIPS entsprochen werden.
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